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Abstract. In this article a major argument by D. Dennett is analysed
in order to provide an ultimate argumentation against any possible
declination ofCartesianMaterialism, meant as an effective theoretical
paradigm to frame any issue concerning the problem of conscious-
ness. In order to do so, Dennett formulates an alternative explana-
tion of consciousness, which is supposedly more consistent with the
available empirical evidences concerning the way the brain works.
This is theMultiple Draft Theory, which the philosopher supports by
adopting the colour phi phenomenon, a widely known perceptual illu-
sion, as a major supporting evidence. This phenomenon is extremely
relevant to Dennett as it challenges a common intuition about con-
scious experiences, notably instantiated within the Cartesian Theatre
Paradigm both in its materialistic and dualistic version, namely that
the temporal order of conscious experiences reflects the temporal or-
der of the events in the external world that triggered them. The colour
phi phenomenon, however, shows that this is not the case, making
a reformulation of the basic notions orbiting around the problem of
consciousness necessary to be rethought.
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Introduction: Dennett’s critical target
The analysis of the colour phi phenomenon represents a fundamental step in
Dennett’s explanation of Consciousness, as it leads him to definitively give up
any legitimacy to the materialistic version of the Cartesian Theatre explanatory
paradigm – or Cartesian Materialism – left aside its dualistic version. Further-
more, he develops an alternative, more effective explanation for the arising of
consciousness, theMultiple Drafts Theory.
In W. Seager’s words, Cartesian Materialism includes “any view that asserts
there is some property in the brain which ’fixes’ one’s states of consciousness
and their temporal relationships” (Seager 1999, 111). This condition would be
fulfilled by a native theory according to which there is a place in the brain where
“it all comes together” and conscious experiences are produced. It would be
also fulfilled by a perhaps more acceptable view of consciousness according to
which conscious states depend on the global activity of the brain and are just
“a matter of a representation exceeding some threshold of activation over the
whole cortex” (Dennett 1991, 166). In fact, in both cases we are dealing with
a brain mechanism, located in a single place (a so-called neural correlate of
consciousness) or spread around the whole cortex (a threshold system), that
produces conscious experiences, which share its very same temporal features:
the order the stimuli get to the neural correlate of consciousness or make the
neurons’ activation exceeding the proper threshold corresponds with the order
of the conscious experiences caused by these very same stimuli. This is the
CartesianMaterialism core idea against whichDennett addresses his conclusions
concerning the colour phi phenomenon1. He claims that the features of our
conscious experiences are not mirrored by any brain features, considered as
representational vehicles, whereas the only restriction on the relation between a
conscious experience and a brain state that underlies it concerns the contents:
the latter must somehow underlie the contents of the former, while any other
phenomenal property, such as the temporal order of the perceived events in the
case of colour phi phenomenon, must not be exhibited by the representational
brain states (Akins 1996, 15).
In this article, I will explain how Dennett manages to dismiss any possible
version of Cartesian Materialism by analysing the temporal properties of the
colour phi phenomenon and so providing an alternative explanation of these
1CartesianMaterialism, as Dennett states, represents a very dangerous temptation for any account
of consciousness, independently of their sophistication. For instance, even the eminent Global
NeuronalWorkspaceModel can still be interpreted through theCartesian Theatre Paradigm, although
it denies the existence of a neural correlate of consciousness. In fact, if a threshold system or a
top-downmechanism was recognised as determining the dominant neural coalition to gain global
availability so that consciousness is generated, then there would be a specific brain feature which
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features based on the Multiple Drafts Model.
1 Explaining the Colour phi phenomenon: two hy-
pothesis from CartesianMaterialism
The colour phi phenomenon was detected first by Michael von Grünau and Paul
Kolers in 1976 as a variation of the traditional phi phenomenon. It represents
major evidence for the search for object continuity as being a basic feature of
visual perception (Seager 1999, 120). Two dots of light are displayed in rapid
succession on a screen separated by four degrees of visual angle. The first dot
is red and flashes on for 150 msec. Then it goes off and 50 milliseconds later it
is followed by a blue dot that flashes on for 150 milliseconds as well. Watching
these dots going on and off in such a fashion, a subject would not report to see
two different dots flashing in sequence, but he would claim to see one single dot
moving and changing colour mid-trajectory instead (Akin 1996, 4).
This phenomenon is extremely relevant to Dennett as it challenges a common in-
tuition about conscious experiences. The intuition is that the order of conscious
experiences reflects the order of the events in the external world that triggered
them. The colour phi phenomenon, however, shows that thismight not be always
the case: in fact, it appears that a moving and colour-changing percept of the dot
has been first created by the brain and then interpolated between the red and
the blue dot. Therefore, as precognition is excluded, the intervening-moving dot
seems to be produced retrospectively after the second dot is perceived and then
projected backwards in time within the subject conscious experience through
a puzzling andmysterious mechanism (Dennett 1991, 6). At the very least, this
phenomenon reveals that, at a micro-time scale, the temporal order of the events
included in our conscious experiences is determined by unconscious cognitive
processes and it does not need to reflect the actual order of the correlated events
in the external world. For this reason, the phi phenomenon appears to Dennett
as a possibly powerful evidence against Cartesian Materialism, since the latter
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conscious experiences (Seager 1999, 120). Starting from these considerations,
Dennett engages in a confrontation between two possible explanations of the phi
phenomenon which are ascribable to Cartesian Materialism, on the one hand,
and his own explanation, which is based on the Multiple Drafts Model, on the
other hand. Dennett’s aim here is to disengage the features of the represented
events - those in the external world coded within the brain processes under-
lying consciousness - from the features of the phenomena representing them,
namely the subject’s conscious experiences (Dennett 1992, 9). His strategy aims
at denying any mechanism which fixes the latter according to the former, so that
Cartesian Materialism would be definitively falsified.
Dennett considers two possible explanatory hypothesis of the colour phi
phenomenon which could be put forward as defenders of the Cartesian The-
atre Paradigm: the Stalinesque Revisionist Hypothesis (H1) and the Orwellian
Revisionist Hypothesis (H2).
According to H1 the conscious experience of themoving dot is generated after
the second dot is presented. Before that, the perceptual inputs of the two dots
are revised so that inferences about those events are made and other illusory
perceptual events are created and interpolated between the two dots in the
manufacturing of the final perceptual experience.
According to H2, however, the conscious experiences of the two distinct dots
occur first, then the same steps postulated by H1 take place: the same inferences
result in the same conclusion and an illusory visual state is manufactured. Then,
the memories of the first experiences are erased and substituted by the new
illusory memories which consequently enter consciousness domain (Akin 1996,
5-7).
The main difference between these two models concerns the moment within
the sequence of brain processes when the perceptual content becomes con-
scious: in the Stalinesque model this happens only in the end, when the per-
ceptual experience is manufactured, while in the Orwellian model it happens
twice, immediately after the input is received and after the false memories about
the perceptual experience substitute the original memories (Akin 1996, 8). As
Dennett states, however, this distinction is actually not relevant, as H1 andH2 are
impossible to be distinguished experimentally: on the one hand, such a precise
serial sequence of processes cannot be discriminated observing the brain activity,
while, on the other hand, by probing the subject, it is impossible to differentiate
a revised perceptual experience from a revised memory of it at such a temporal
scale. According to Dennett, in fact, probing subjects experiencing the colour
phi phenomenon just proves that what they refer to, when they talk about their
conscious experiences actually consists of fake perceptualmemories and nothing
more. However, it cannot be known if thesememories arememories of an illusory
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illusory conscious experience (H2) (Dennett 1992, 17).
Therefore, Dennett’s argumentation can be summarized in this way: con-
frontingH1 andH2, he uses a verificationist argument to claim that, as there is no
way to distinguish them, there is no difference between them2; then he opposes
the core Cartesian perspective shared by both – that there are conscious states
whose features are somehow preliminarily fixed according to univocal brain
mechanisms (1) – with the claim that there is no conscious states (2) but only
false memories of conscious experiences continuously formed (3); he eventually
concludes, consistently with a verificationist strategy, that the first claim (1) and
the first part of the second claim (2) are undistinguishable as unprovable, while
only the second part of the second claim (3) is verified by the subjects’ probes
(Seager 1999, 123).
This conclusion deeply threatens the existence of consciousness as conceived
byCartesianMaterialism. The reason is that, what turns out as conscious, namely
the reported fake memories, does not fulfil the necessary condition required by
Cartesian Materialism: the temporal order of these conscious experiences does
not appear to be fixed according to a univocal mechanismwithin the brain. How-
ever, this is not enough to eliminate any possible version ofCartesianMaterialism
from the set of the possible explanations of the colour phi phenomenon. In fact,
consciousness can still be conceived as a product of brain states which is gener-
ated within it at some specific moment, even if it is made of fake memories and
it doesn’t mirror the temporal features of the outside-world events. Therefore, a
further move is needed in Dennett’s argumentation in order to definitively tackle
the core idea of the Cartesian Theatre Paradigm. This move will be made by pro-
viding the already verified fact that only false memories are somehow conscious
with an adequate explanation, which is empirically grounded and, at the same
time, not consistent with the Cartesian Theatre Paradigm. The Multiple Drafts
Model will serve the cause.
2 Dennett’s target: the Cartesian core of Stalinesque
and Orwellian Revisionist Hypothesis
In the first paragraph I have analysed the explanation of the colour phi phe-
nomenon provided by H1 and H2 and Dennett’s refusal of their legitimacy based
on a verificationist argument. I will now consider more deeply the core idea un-
derlying both H1 and H2, in contrast to which Dennett’s alternative explanation
of consciousness based on theMultiple Drafts Theory arises.
2Seager names Dennett’s verificationism “micro-verificationism” since he restricts its application
to short periods of time, namely a few hundred milliseconds. This, in fact, is the time scale employed
in measuring neurophysiological events. The core principle, anyway, remains the same: if something





Davide Scotti Dennet against Cartesian Materialism
The Stalinesque and the OrwellianHypothesis are two alternative explanatory
models equally based on the same conception of the brain processes underlying
conscious experiences – or, more precisely, what the subject would report as such
– as a serial sequence of operations within the brain. According to this fundamen-
tal idea, the colour phi-phenomenon occurs since, after the perception of the
two inputs – which could be either conscious (H1) or unconscious (H2) – a series
of propositional inferences led by the urge for object continuity takes place, and
results in the conclusion that the dot has moved and has changed its colour. As a
consequence, a conscious perceptual experience (H1) or a falsememory of it (H2)
is manufactured accordingly (Akin 1996, 7). The seriality of these processes is the
crucial feature that allows the identification of a turning point, after which the
contents of the brain processes become conscious. Therefore, this very moment
in the process can be conceivably identified in order to provide a criterion for the
order of conscious experiences to be established consistently with the order of
the external events provoking the stimuli. This is exactly the core idea underlying
the Cartesian Theatre metaphor criticised by Dennett, and it occurs in both the
Stalinesque and the Orwellian models in the form of a further representation
– a revision indeed – of the stimuli that have already been discriminated once
and are thus already coded in contentful brain processes (Dennett 1992, 4). In
fact, according to these models, the input from the external world, after it has
been discriminated through several lower level brain processes, is supposedly
represented as a contentful brain state to another brain system in order to be-
come part of the subject’s conscious experience. In the Stalinesque model this
happenswhen the brain produces a perceptual conscious experience after having
discriminated and revised all the visual inputs provided by the display of the
colour phi phenomenon. In the Orwellian model this happens even twice: in the
first place when the first perceptual experience is produced and in the second
place when the revised memories substitute the storage memories of the first
visual experiences (Akin 1996, 8).
3 TheMultipleDraftsTheory: analternativeexplana-
torymodel
In order to dismiss the already unverifiable explanatory models based on the
Cartesian Theatre Paradigm, Dennett describes the way brainmechanismsmight
function in parallel, providing so a convincing explanation of any possible colour
phi-kind of phenomena and consequently excising overall the idea of serial
processes within the brain. This parallel-processing system is namedMultiple
Drafts Model and it relies on well-grounded experimental studies. Its core idea
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activity – are accomplished by parallel, multi-track processes of interpretation
and elaboration of sensory inputs” (Dennett 1991, 111). Therefore the brain is
a parallel processing machine, so that any function implemented in it, also the
so-called consciousness, relies on mechanisms based on parallel processing.
What is mainly relevant in this model for Dennett’s theoretical purposes is the
denial of a conceivable precise moment or step within the overall process which
can be considered as the when andwhere of conscious states generation, a sort of
conscious experiences output. On the contrary, there is not supposed to be any
fixed pathway or mechanism that determines univocally which brain contents
become conscious andwhich do not andwhen they do. Conversely, the brain pro-
cesses configuration underlying each conscious state reflects the overall activity
of the brain and it is always different according to the specific conditions of each
moment, such as the hardware constraints, the kind of stimuli involved in the
processes, the environmental conditions or the subject’s behavioural demands.
According to the Multiple Drafts Model, the brain is constituted of several
modules. Eachmodule has a specific function and it is interconnectedwithmany
other modules in a not-hierarchical way. Most of the connections are reciprocal
and different processes run simultaneously. Within this model a visual stimulus,
for instance, would initially pass through the lowest levels of the visual system,
where the basic features of the receptive field related to each retina cell, which are
not part of our conscious experience, are serially detected (LGN, V1 and V2). After
that, it would spread among several modules which process different higher-level
information about it simultaneously. Each of these modules would process and
exchange with each other different kind of information about the very same stim-
ulus: shape, colour, position, movement are some of its properties discriminated
by these modules. By communicating with each other, they manage to jointly
generate several more or less effective alternative interpretations of the stimuli,
competing with each other to provide the whole system with a representation
of the external world: these are the so-called “multiple drafts” (Akin 1996, 13).
One of these interpretations, resulting from the work of a certain configuration
of parallel brain processes, overcome the others, that involve different config-
urations, and it achieves the monopoly over the brain resources in that very
moment. Consequently, it determines the whole system behavioural outcome,
which includes also what the subject perceives, constituting thus a moment of
the subject’s conscious experience. No top level control is needed, but a kind of
“democratic” competition among different configurations takes place (Dennett
2001, 225).
In this overall process each module determines certain properties of the stim-
uli by ordinary computational process, whose conclusion can be theoretically
timed (Akin 1996, 13). The conscious states generation process, however, cannot
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factured consciousness, but only several processes with different functions and
different timings, covering different brain pathways: they jointly determine the
commonly called conscious states, which are nothing else but the combined
effect of these interacting brain processes on the whole system. In the colour
phi phenomenon case, for example, the two stimuli are processed by the brain
through several spread parallel processes which represent different features of
them. From the interaction among these processes, a possible interpretation
about the relation between the two dots emerges, whose effect is the subject
experiencing the one moving and colour-changing dot (Akin 1996, 20-23).
Therefore, since the criteria for the dominant interpretation to win this com-
petition among several “drafts” are not fixed nor predictable and thence there
is no proper consciousness generation process through which the contents of
conscious experiences are sequentially determined, the temporal features of a
conscious experience do not have to reflect the temporal features of the underly-
ing contents-carrying brain processes3: there is no trace of CartesianMaterialism
eventually.
4 Consciousness re-conceived: CerebralCelebrityand
Clout
So far I have shown how the Multiple Drafts Model is able to offer an alternative
explanation of the colour phi phenomenon, which, as Dennett states, deprives
any declination of CartesianMaterialism of explanatory efficacy. Therefore, since
Cartesian Materialism conceptualisation has to be set apart together with its
account of consciousness, Dennett provides a new way to conceive the concept
of “consciousness” by using twometaphors to describe it: thus, consciousness
is described as a “cerebral celebrity” within the brain, or it can be explained in
terms of “clout”.
As stated in the previous paragraph, according to the Multiple Drafts Model,
what makes a configuration of interacting, contentful brain processes conscious
is its temporary control of the whole system. On the strength of this considera-
tion Dennett compares consciousness to a brain process - or a configuration of
brain processes - which is a trending celebrity among all the brain processes at
a certain moment: this brain process would then hold the power to control the
subject’s behaviour in virtue of its fame around the whole brain processes com-
munity (Seager 1999, 113). This metaphorical representation of consciousness is
intended to contrast the intuitive and shared idea of consciousness as a “medium
of representation” within the brain “into which content-bearing events must be
3The Multiple Drafts Model of the brain seems to boast some relevant empirical supporting
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transduced in order to become conscious”, a view that is strictly committed to the
Cartesian Theatre Paradigm (Dennett 2000, 224). Conversely, consciousness is
conceived as being what happens when an unconscious contentful brain process
among several others competing with each other achieves enough “clout” to
temporary dominate the “political scene” within the brain and consequently
control the body.
Consciousness, understood as anything that is included in the subject’s ex-
perience, is then a sequence of dominant coalitions of brain processes which
follow one another according to the very moment conditions and demands of
the environment (Dennett 2000, 225).
The distinct concepts of “fame” and “clout” are used seemingly here, but,
even if they are strictly connected, they actually underline two different aspects
of conscious states within the metaphorical framework of the Multiple Drafts
Model. The concept of “Fame”, in fact, endorses the concept of knowledge and
lay emphasis on the content of this knowledge, while “clout” refers to the power
to control others’ behaviour. Somebody is famous if they are known by many
people, and themore they are known themore influential they are on thesemany
people. The way other people are influenced by celebrity depends on the way
these people consider the holder of this celebrity. Similarly, within this brain
model, “celebrity” or “fame” refers to the amount of consideration into which the
content of a certain brain processes configuration, namely the combination of
certain properties of the stimuli processed by each neural mechanisms involved,
are taken by the rest of the system. Then, the “clout” of the dominant coalition of
brain processes follows from its fame around the brain, so that the fame of the
coalition is proportional to its power to determine the whole system behavioural
outcome. However, the way this clout is exercised in order to influence the body
behaviour is determined by its content.
5 Temporal properties of conscious experiences
This distinction between “celebrity” and “clout” sheds light on Dennett’s char-
acterization of conscious states as narratives (Seager 1999, 120). In fact, he also
defines consciousness as a fiction, a narrative that is continuously edited, re-
vised andmodified by the brain, whose content, moment bymoment, consists of
judgements concerning the features of the external world, provided by the brain
modules included in the same dominant coalition dealing with the interpretation
of the incoming stimuli. Each module contributes to the formation of an overall
interpretation of the stimuli, and the more an interpretation gain support from
other brain modules - that is the more famous it is- the more clout on them it
has. The resulting interpretation, then , is what determines the way the clout is
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Such a way to conceptualize consciousness is useful to disengage it from the
dangerously obvious idea that the order of the experienced events has to be mir-
rored by the order of the corresponding events in the external word. As it should
now be clear, the reason is that timing has been recognised as a matter of inter-
pretation of the stimuli provided by the dominant brain processes coalition. In
fact, according to theMultiple Draft Theory, the temporal properties of conscious
experiences are conveyed as time-related judgements within the interpretation
of the stimuli received by the brain, independently from the actual order these
stimuli are received by the system. To clearly understand this, it might be useful
to draw an analogy with language. Indeed, in a proposition describing a certain
series of events, the order of its parts does not need to mirror the order of the
described events, but the timing of the represented events can be rather conveyed
otherwise, such as by adverbs. In the same way, information about timing are
possibly conveyed symbolically by the brain states underlying conscious experi-
ences, so that they do not need to reflect the order of the external events which
triggered them (Dennett 1992, 35). This is normally not true at a macroscopic
time scale - the time scale we would say that fits our experience – as in this case
there is usually a correspondence between the events in the external world and
the events in our conscious experience and it is accepted by anybody that the
order of the first ones fixes the order of the second ones. At a micro-time scale,
however, this correspondence is not necessary, since an interpretation of certain
stimuli whose features diverges from the those of the actual events provoking
them can get enough clout over the rest of the system to determine the subject’s
perceptual experience and thus drive his behaviour. According to Dennett, this
is exactly what happens in the colour phi phenomenon: the network of brain
processes carrying the interpretation of the stimuli as provoked by amoving- and
colour changing-dot takes control over the whole system, determining the experi-
ence reported by every subject. This might happen because evolution privileged
somehow the ability to detect continuity in moving object over the accuracy of
temporal representation of stimuli. Therefore, at the colour phi phenomenon
time scale, the timing of the experienced events is supposed to be coded in a
symbolical way by the brain processes which are about these events, exactly as
adverbs in natural language propositions or the practice of dating letters can be
used to symbolically locate the events they refer to in time (Dennett 1992, 9).
6 Conclusion: from Cartesian Materialism falsifica-
tion to consciousness re-conception
I will now schematically summarize Dennett’s argument against Cartesian Mate-
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In order to falsify B Dennett analy-
ses the Stalinesque -H1- and the Or-
wellian -H2- explanatory models of the
phi phenomenon which fulfil the suffi-
cient condition B to be considered as
proper declination of Cartesian Mate-
rialism (B → C ). He establishes an
exclusive disjunction between H1 and
H2 core idea (C) and the opposite idea
that the conscious experiences tem-
poral order (at a micro-time scale) is
not fixed accordingly to the underly-
ing brain states temporal order (C ∨D).
He uses a verificationist argument to
showhowH1 andH2 are undistinguish-
able as unverifiable, while the only em-
pirical fact about the colour phi phe-
nomenon, namely that conscious ex-
periences consist of false memories, is
better explained by the Multiple Draft
Model (E). This alternative explanation
implies D, thus, once Dennett assumes
E, he derives D, then ¬C, ¬B and even-
tually ¬A: Cartesian Materialism is fal-
sified.
Once Cartesian Materialism is falsified, the way to conceptualise consciousness
which has originated from it must be set apart, and the concept of “conscious-
ness” must be rethought. Dennett thus dismisses the idea of consciousness as
something that is produced within the brain in a certain moment through a
certain system, and endorse instead the idea that consciousness, meant as first
person experience, is spread around the brain, parcelled out to various brain
modules and “incorporated into themultifarious further effects of all the political
influence achievable in the competitions” among several parallel brain processes
(Dennett 2000, 228). The “cerebral celebrity” and “clout” metaphors support
this re-definition purpose, connecting the definition of consciousness to the
observable manifestation of its effect, whose colour phi phenomenon perceptual
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